in the *Annual Review of Psychology*, 1967, and the earlier articles of
Edwards referenced there.

Clearly though, there are advantages in a unified treatment of the
practical aspects of the theory, and this is provided in an eminently
readable fashion by Miller and Starr. In addition to the decision theory
per se, they have a good discussion of more general concepts of decision
making including communication networks, multiple goals, bounded
rationality, and the last chapter especially, "When Is a Problem Worth
Solving," is probably the clearest and most sensible discussion of this
topic available. Simple examples are used throughout to illustrate the
concepts being discussed. However, it would have been useful to show
how applicable the methods are in handling at least one large-scale
problem. Problems are presented at the end of each chapter to allow
the reader to test his grasp of the content of the chapter. Some of these
problems are quite thought provoking.

In summary let me repeat that this is a reasonable book for the
manager or student with a practical orientation, but the social scientist
can most usefully consult other sources.

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*Management and Machiavelli: An Inquiry into the Politics of Cor-
    porate Life.* By Antony Jay. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
    Winston, 1967. 244 pp. $4.95.

Antony Jay believes that enough, indeed too much, knowledge is
available about the modern organization. What is needed is a new way
to look at the morass of facts. An historical and political science per-
spective is the antidote that he recommends.

Jay uses Machiavelli as the framework. He believes that Machiavelli
had much to say that is relevant to the political life of a modern cor-
poration. Jay makes a case for this belief. But, it is difficult to ascertain
how good a case he has made.

Two major problems with the analysis are the kinds of concepts and
operational definitions used. For example, concepts about leadership
are defined in terms of characters in plays ("King Lear"), historical
figures (Nicholas II), and memorable sermons (pussycat). When one
looks for a conceptual definition of each he will only find dimensions
which seem poorly defined and at times contradictory. In the case of

King Lear, complete delegation is dangerous because subordinates will turn nasty and refuse to give him the information he needs. Lear should have known that power lies in the acceptance of (his) authority by others. This seems fair enough until we read in the next sentence that acceptance of the superior's power by others comes from their knowledge that if they resist him they will fail and he will succeed. As to operational definitions, they are almost non-existent.

A third major problem with the book is the kind of data the author uses as evidence. An experience he had while a member of a large firm, a juicy story told to him by a knowledgeable friend, a quotation from a book that fits his theory, and an extrapolation spontaneous and almost unbounded are examples of his main sources. For example, he reads a message from Machiavelli to "several managers who have had to cope with takeovers" and then points with apparent pride to the fact that they were with him to a man.

Jay begins by condemning traditional management science because its propositions are idealistic statements about what ought to be. Since they are not based upon an examination of what is, the propositions have the same impact as do such generalizations as "love thy neighbor" or "do unto others as you would have them do unto you." Jay then continues his analysis and falls into the same trap. His definitions of a creative group lack empirical support and indeed read as if they were taken from the American Management Association literature. For example, in creative groups (1) the authority of the leader himself is unquestioned and unchallenged, (2) the leader of a creative group must have as much autonomy as possible, (3) creative groups have to grow or they die, (4) if the creative leader is removed from a group, it becomes an extinct volcano.

My reaction to such generalizations is "says who?" How does he know these are valid? Jay does not seem to be concerned about specifying the conditions under which his generalizations hold. This leads him to state generalizations whose validity may be seriously questioned. For example,

(1) In an organization directed under a tough and strong top man, it is very hard to force or intrigue your way to the top (p. 8).

(2) Most takeovers need a bastard if they are to be complete and ... successful ... (p. 23).

(3) General Dynamics had too much decentralization (p. 37).

(4) The real pleasure of power is the pleasure of freedom (p. 38).

(5) Successful executives centralize power and make decisions (p. 38).

(*6*) The processes by which the pope could offer a million gold ducats to Philip is similar to the ones the President (of the United States) can use to offer huge government contracts to IBM and AT&T.

(*7*) The (creative) process is, in fact, almost uncomfortably similar to sexual intercourse. The male, the father, say the product planning manager, has the seed of the idea and he sends for special projects designers. (He) transfers the idea (the seed) and it is accepted by the female (the product planning manager) and they both relax in a state of euphoric creative exhaustion (p. 91).

The book is beautifully written. Also, it has some very important and insightful passages. There is the hypothesis that what prevented the Roman Empire from crumbling faster was the lack of fast and accurate communication. The colonies had to be left to their adminis-trators. For this reason, administrators were carefully chosen. There is also a typology of ineffective leaders from whose experience Jay squeezes out the following "positive guiding principles":

(*1*) Always take the heaviest responsibility yourself.

(*2*) Remember that your own craft skill is not a rampart of your defense, but a barrier to your advance.

(*3*) Always hunt for the disquieting evidence.

(*4*) Spend most of your time among the most powerful group in the organization.

(*5*) Win opposition over to your side or at least to neutrality; do not raise your own private army to fight it.

Jay points out that Machiavelli's main purpose was "simply to analyze what practices had brought political success in the past and to deduce from these what principles ought to be followed for political success in the present" (p. 24). Herein lies the gravest limitation of Machiavelli and of Jay. Both make an assumption that:

From a description of past practices it is possible to develop norma-tive statements about successful practices in the present because the future will be similar to the past.

The danger is that the past may not contain in it the qualities that are relevant to the present. For example, one of Jay's underlying themes is power. His advice always seems to be that power is the key to success. This is undertandable since his source is Machiavelli. The difficulty with extrapolating to the future is that the conditions under which Machiavelli lived might not be as relevant in the 1960's. For example, because of the information science revolution the key to power may well be competence and the generation of internal commit-

ment to decisions made by a team of executives. The team does not
become important because the executives like groups—indeed, many
deplore groups. The team approach may become necessary because
the range and scope of information that can now be dealt with (and,
therefore, for which the president may be held accountable) is so vast
that no one individual can process and understand it. In a recent study
of three hundred decisions by boards of directors and executive com-
mittees, we found chairmen and presidents worrying less about making
decisions and much more about developing viable decision-making
networks.

Another major theme emerging from this research is that the ma-
jority of the activities within firms is routine and programmed; the
minority is innovative and creative. The former is important in main-
taining a steady state; the latter in growth and survival.

Information within a system tends to be accurate when it deals with
the routine and significantly *less* accurate when it deals with the inno-
vative aspects. Organizations tend to generate valid information when
they need it least.

The research suggests that if valid information is to be generated,
organizations need to create conditions for intergroup trust, problem
solving, openness, concern, and self-acceptance. These conditions
are almost the opposite of those recommended by Jay. That the author
would probably disagree with these generalizations is *not* the problem.
The problem is that he does not seem to be aware of these trends so
that he could at least dismiss them through careful analysis.

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The Efficiency of Control Strategies: Communication and Decision-
    Making in Organizations. By Dick Ramström. Stockholm: Alm-
    qvist & Wiksell, 1967. 442 pp. SW. KR. 90.

This book presents a conceptual framework for the analysis of
"the cognitive aspects of decision-making and information processing
in organizations." In doing so, the author introduces 140 terms and
definitions, states 65 postulates, and derives 98 testable theorems.
These are conveniently summarized by chapter in 27 pages at the end
of the book, and each term, postulate, and theorem is cross-referenced